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ABSTRACT
This article develops a new way of understanding the integration of
emotions in practical life and the practical appraisal of emotions,
drawing on insights from both J-P. Sartre and R. G. Collingwood. I
develop a concept of “practical metabolism” and show that
emotions need to be understood not only as transformations from
determinate to indeterminate practical intuitions, but also as
transformations in the reverse direction. Firstly, I provide a new
conception of the dynamic phenomenal structure of the emotions
that can resolve significant tensions in the Sartre’s theory.
Secondly, I develop that theory to shed light on the diverse
socially mediated roles of emotions in practical life by drawing on
Collingwood’s philosophy of magic. Thirdly, I deploy the notion of
practical metabolism to address the appraisal of emotions, setting
out a framework for understanding the various ways in which
emotional expression is subject to structural breakdown.
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To understand the emotions we need to understand the variety of roles that they play in
practical life and at the same time how those various roles form a coherent whole.
Emotions are not simply feelings arising when things are going well or otherwise, they
are integrated into our sense of how things are going, embedded in practical life, recog-
nized as motivating and demotivating of action.1 Emotions are also the objects of our
action, when we act to motivate (or demotivate) ourselves, and the aim of action, when
we act in order to bring about emotions.2 An integrated understanding requires a phenom-
enology of emotions that does not consider them as isolable elements of single actions, but
rather as integral to the dynamic structure of open-ended practical concern. 3
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1 Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will; Helm, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value.
2 Elster, “Emotion and Action.”
3 This is the key point of convergence amongst those who take a distinctively phenomenological view of the emotions:
emotions have an intentional structure that involves the affective presentation, in intuition, of practical and evaluative
sense. Emotions for phenomenologists are what Bennett Helm calls “felt evaluations,” Helm, Emotional Reason: Delib-
eration, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. These original affective presentations cannot be reduced to forms of cog-
nition or perception, but they do call for an integrated account that seeks to understand the interactions of affective
presentations with perception and cognition, Steinbock, Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart. Precisely
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The late 1930s saw a remarkable convergence in the ideas of two prominent thinkers,
working in very different philosophical contexts, that together form a basis for such an
integrated phenomenology of emotions. Jean-Paul Sartre and R. G. Collingwood were
both convinced that emotions cannot be adequately grasped simply in terms of what
happens to us, but instead must be thought of in terms of activities undertaken in the
context of practical life. More specifically, they both argued that emotions should be
understood as involving “magical” activity, that is, activity that constitutes and trans-
forms the sense of the lived experience in which action is undertaken. For both Sartre
and Collingwood “magic” is given a phenomenological sense, developed in dialogue
with the leading anthropology of their day, so that it designates all of the activities and
practices that bring about transformations in our lived experience by initiating, develop-
ing and sustaining emotions.4 “Magic” in this sense has a very wide application that goes
beyond the contemporary senses of superstitious or pre-scientific attempts to understand
and manipulate natural forces, or a form of entertainment in which a magician performs
surprising feats. Magic in the basic phenomenological sense used here refers to any prac-
tice in which we evoke and sustain emotions for a practical purpose. For example, simple
personal rituals, such as wearing a lucky pair of football boots for an important game, can
be attempts to evoke and sustain emotional confidence. I explore a number of other
examples and types of magic in this sense of affective praxis in Section 3 below, and in
Section 4 I show that many of the more specialized senses of the term “magic” are
special functions, and often perversions, of this basic phenomenological sense.
In this article I argue for a modified version of the account of emotions that Sartre
gives in the Sketch for a Theory of Emotions, extending and developing it in the light
of Collingwood’s analysis of magic as emotional praxis. Unlike simple passive affects,
which we rarely experienced in isolation, emotions are both the objects of practice and
are themselves forms of practical activity, i.e. the practice of “magic” just described.
My account makes use of the phenomenological notion of intuition as the original pres-
entation of the sense of the world in lived experience, and turns on the idea that emotions
are transformations of the sense of the world presented in practical life, i.e. transform-
ations of practical intuition. Practical intuition is the original pre-reflective presentation
of a situation in which one conducts oneself, acts or responds.5 For example, on my way
to the shop I hear the shouts of someone in distress. The situation is presented to me in
practical intuition as one of various possible ways to go on, primarily as one in which I
can continue on my way to my original destination or stop to try to help the stranger in
distress. If I feel alarm at the signs of distress my original intuition of a straightforward
familiar path to the shop is transformed into a far less determinate situation presenting
numerous initially unclear possibilities for lending a hand: Should I check the danger has
what is distinctive about the intentional structure of emotions and what distinguishes the affective presentation of
sense in different emotions is of course subject to intense debate and disagreement amongst phenomenologists of
emotion, Helm, “Affective Intentionality and the Reactive Attitudes” 227–28. See also, Szanto and Landweer, “Intro-
duction: The Phenomenology of Emotions- above and beyond ‘What It Is like to Feel’” 10. The account offered
here follows Sartre in claiming that it is not the intentional structure itself that is distinctive in emotional intuition,
but the transformational dynamic between different intuitions of the practical possibilities in a given situation.
4 Collingwood, The Principles of Art 65–77; Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 66, 72.
5 Sartre insists that the apprehensions of our situation in practical intuition that constitute emotions are originally non-
reflective and that many of the errors of psychological accounts of emotion stem from the assumption that emotional
consciousness is a form of consciousness of emotion, Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 56–57.
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passed? Call an ambulance? Try to give first aid? My emotion here involves the presen-
tation of the situation as posing a problem about what to do and requiring a response in
terms of action. In this example my emotion involves a transformation of a determinate
practical intuition with the goal of reaching the shop by a familiar path into an indeter-
minate one of helping the stranger by means yet to be determined.
I try to demonstrate below that the transformative effect of emotions on practical
intuition is reversible and constitutes a phenomenon that I call “practical metabolism”
because the transformations of practical sense become a continuous cycle of transform-
ation that forms the open-ended basis of practical life (Section 2). I go on to show that
this modified Sartrean account can be developed using Collingwood’s understanding of
the relationship between emotional expression and magical activity, as set out in Prin-
ciples of Art and in his Folktales Manuscript (Section 3).6 The resulting conception
allows for an integrated understanding of the motivating and demotivating dynamics
of emotions and the ways that they are constituted in socially mediated magical practices.
Finally, I turn to the issue of the appraisal of emotions. Drawing on Sartre’s recognition
of false emotions and Collingwood’s analysis of the perversions of magic, I argue that
understanding the various possible breakdowns of our practical metabolism gives us a
framework for the appraisal of emotions conceived as continuous transformations of
open-ended practical concern (Section 4).
The resulting account will, I hope, be of interest for a number of reasons. It aims to
contribute the contemporary philosophical interest in both the specificity of emotions
and their integration into practical life. It contributes to the lively debates concerning
the interpretation Sartre’s early views on emotions that have been reignited in recent
years. It aims to introduce Collingwood’s work on magic and emotion to a wider audi-
ence and to show the relevance of that work to the phenomenology of emotion. Finally,
the account sets out a framework for understanding and appreciating the integral role
that magic, understood as affective praxis, continues to play in practical life.
2. Practical Intuition and Practical Metabolism
The Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, originally published in 1939, is one of Sartre’s
early pre-Being and Nothingness works. The sketch critically appraises prominent philo-
sophical and psychological theories of emotion, before briefly outlining a phenomenolo-
gical conception of emotions that draws upon Sartre’s reading of Husserl and Heidegger.
The central claim of Sartre’s Sketch is that emotions are transformations of the world.
More precisely, Sartre argues that: “All emotions have this in common, that they
evoke the appearance of a world, cruel, terrible, bleak, joyful, etc., but in which the
relations of things to consciousness are always and exclusively magical.”7 There are a
6 Collingwood, The Principles of Art; Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment: Studies in Folktale, Cultural Criticism,
and Anthropology. The folktales manuscript was written between 1937 and 1938 and was first published in 2005 as
part of the volume The Philosophy of Enchantment. The account of magic there forms the basis of the better
known account in Principles of Art, although its approach is on the whole more phenomenological and less categorial,
see Rudzik, “Folklore and History: An Analysis of an Unpublished Manuscript by R.G. Collingwood.” A few studies have
explored the significance of this manuscript for Collingwood’s wider philosophical development, but none have done
so as part of an attempt to develop an integrated understanding of emotion in practical life, see Connelly,
“R. G. Collingwood: From Anthropology to Metaphysics”; Țabrea, “Tradition and Presupposition in Collingwood and
Eliade.”
7 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 81.
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huge variety of feelings and valences that appear in the world as presented in emotions,
but what they have in common according to Sartre is a certain kind of transformation of
the practical sense of the world. For Sartre, as we will see in the following analysis, this
transformation amounts to what might be called a “de-determination” of the world, that
is, the freeing up of configurations of practical possibility.
My argument in this paper is that emotional transformations of the world are bidir-
ectional and that the two directions of transformation form an integrated practical
metabolism. Along with the “de-determination” of the world that Sartre describes
there is also emotional re-determination of the world, the consolidation of configurations
of practical potential. To take up one of Sartre’s own examples, flight in the face of a fer-
ocious beast may not initially be a prudent escape, but a species of “magical” conduct that
attempts “negate the dangerous object with one’s whole body.”8 Nevertheless, what Sartre
fails to make clear is that, with the appearance of a tree of convenient climbing height, a
wild flight into an indeterminate world is once again transformed and re-determined into
a world in which a prudent escape is indeed possible. This second transformation is not a
breaking away from emotion by means of rational reflection, but a further development
of the pre-reflective emotion itself, with its own concomitant activity that evokes
emotions of resoluteness. Thus, I will argue, Sartre is right to say that all emotions are
transformations of the world, but wrong to claim that they are all transformations of
the first kind.
Sartre focusses almost exclusively on the first kind of de-determining transformation
although his account clearly implies the possibility of the second re-determining kind.
His theory is that all emotions are transformations towards a world of indeterminate
practical potential. A clear problem for that claim is that it makes it difficult to see
how emotion relates to activity that successfully navigates determinate practical path-
ways, i.e. how emotion motivates effective action. Emotions for Sartre are activities
that engage with practical difficulty by transforming the world into one in which difficul-
ties are no longer experienced as such. The determinate world throws up obstacles, which
are unreflectively taken to be too much to overcome: “The world is difficult.”9 Frustration
plays such a key role in Sartre’s analysis that Elpidorou describes him as positing the
“primacy of frustration.”10 Sartre is clear that, whilst emotions are particular kinds of
engagement with practical difficulty, they are for him engagements that are always
ineffective in the terms of the determinate world in which the difficulty makes its
appearance.11
Let us take a closer look at what Sartre actually means by the transformation of the
world into a magical world. The notion of a magical world is set up in contrast to the
world apprehended by someone whose practical endeavours are proceeding more or
less in order. For someone in that situation, the world presents itself as a deterministic
instrumental complex. Emotion is experienced when that order breaks down in the
face of difficulty:
8 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 67.
9 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 62.
10 Elpidorou, “Emotions in Early Sartre: The Primacy Frustration.”
11 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 65.
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We can now conceive what an emotion is. It is a transformation of the world. When the
paths before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer
put up with such an exacting and difficult world. All ways are barred and nevertheless we
must act. So then we try to change the world; that is, to live it as though the relations
between things and their potentialities were not governed by deterministic processes but
by magic.12
Since Sartre presents the onset of emotion as the transformation of a determinate world
into a contrasting magical world, one is led to conclude that a magical world is a dissol-
ution of the instrumental complex into a non-deterministic world. Note, however, that
the magical world is never identified with an utterly indeterminate chaos in which no
meaningful links can be made between one event and another. In pure chaos there
can be no sense to the idea of a magical practitioner mysteriously and wondrously bring-
ing about a magical event. Nor can there be any sense in asking how the event was
brought about and attempting to answer either in magical terms – such as pointing
out an incantation or magical instrument – or in deflationary causal terms. In fact, the
very distinction between a “magical explanation” and “causal explanation” fails to take
account of the fact that the world is in both cases irreducibly apprehended in the
terms of practical intuition.
For practical intuition transformation into a magical world is not a dissolution of
determinate causes into pure chaos, but a dissolution of determinate practical pathways
into indeterminate practical potential. The determinism of the instrumental world is not
causal determinism, but a determinate order of practical possibilities, which Sartre
describes as follows:
The means themselves appear to us as potentialities that lay claim to our existence. The
apprehension of the means as the one possible path to the attainment of the end (or, if
there are n means, as the n that alone are possible) may be called the pragmatic intuition
of the determinism of the world.13
Sartre goes on to provide some helpful images of determinate pragmatic intuition. We
can think of this as a world, “all furrowed with straight and narrow paths leading to
such and such determinate end” or a “pin table” game in which you guide the ball
along paths formed by rows of pins. The contrasting magical world is not an attempt
to disengage with the practical world and, in the face of frustration, withdraw into our
own fantasy. A magical world should be thought instead as a pragmatic intuition of
the indeterminism of the world. Here “indeterminism” does not mean without causal
determination. It means rather a freer and looser determination of practical potential.
In a magical world there are not n ways to achieve one’s end, whether or not one
knows the value of n. The pathways no longer form a set of determinate value. The
world is no longer “furrowed with straight and narrow paths,” but neither is it featureless
and without any contour. It is not suddenly possible to reach a destination without taking
any path at all, although it might seem that way in contrast to a world of straight and
narrow paths. A “magical” pin table would not be one on which balls and pins appear
and disappear at random and there is no longer any sense to “guiding” a ball. A
magical pin table would instead be without a determinate set of pathways, one where
12 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 63.
13 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 62.
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pins have ambiguous value in terms of their guiding and obstructing of balls, and the
goals are ambiguous in terms of their achievability. Practical determinacy or indetermi-
nacy of this kind is not simply a question of knowledge or lack of knowledge, since the
world might present itself as affording n possibilities without our knowing the value of n,
but in a world of indeterminate potential there is no determinate value of n for us to
know or not know.
This interpretation of what Sartre means by the transformation of practical intuition
lends itself naturally to the modification that I want to designate as “practical metab-
olism.” The idea is that practical-emotive life is characterized by a continuous cycle of
reversible transformations of practical intuition; from determinate to indeterminate
and from indeterminate to determinate.14 In this cycle difficulties appear and the ways
forward lose their determinacy. Then practical pathways are re-determined, some of
which may not have appeared at all in the first set of determinate intuitions. I call this
a “metabolism” both because it is a description of practical life that focuses on the
changes that our practical intuition continually undergoes rather than considering
action in causal terms,15 and because those changes form a metabolic cycle as practical
difficulties are metabolized in de-determining (“catabolic“) and re-determining (“ana-
bolic”) transformations.16
Sartre’s interpreters have tended to downplay or even repudiate the structural role that
he assigns to “magic.” Robert Solomon, for example, has for many years recognized the
significance of Sartre’s idea that emotions are integral to magical practice, but his associ-
ation of magic with the irrational and his determination to show that emotions are not
essentially irrational has led him to deny a structural role for magic in emotion.17 Others
have followed suit, claiming that Sartre thinks of emotions as perversions of conscious-
ness or that he only really deals with a problematic class of emotions.18 Martin Hartmann
has mounted a defence of the Sketch, arguing that the critics are misled by an
14 The idea of practical metabolism that I am developing here has affinities with Heidegger’s analysis of the dynamic of
“handiness” and “unhandiness” in Chapter 3 of Being and Time. Indeed, I believe it is crucial to understand that
dynamic precisely in terms of a continuous cycle of (generally very slight or unnoticed) “breakdowns” and recoveries,
rather than as consisting of sustained periods of smoothly running handiness interspersed with periodic catastrophic
breakdowns into unhandiness (although more or less catastrophic breakdowns are of course always possible). Further
work to determine the potential for integrating Heidegger’s own analysis of attunements and moods, into this frame-
work is likely to be illuminating, as I indicate in the conclusion to this paper. Heidegger’s well-known remarks on
“magic and fetishism” as bound up with “primitive Dasein” for whom signs “coincide” with what they indicate,
might also add an important, although potentially problematic, dimension to the understanding of magical activity
I develop here. Sartre’s own analysis is clearly influenced by his reading of Being and Time, although his brief reference
to Heidegger in the conclusion of the Sketch is itself quite problematic, Heidegger, Being and Time 80. Sartre refers to
emotion as “one of the great attitudes” or “ways in which consciousness understands (in Heidegger’s sense of Verste-
hen) its Being-in-the-world.” He thus implies that there are other attitudes and ways of understanding that do not
involve emotion, which is clearly not Heidegger’s view, Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 91.Cf. Heidegger,
Being and Time §29.
15 See Tillman, “Acts and Changes: A Metabolic Approach to the Philosophy of Action.” for a complementary approach to
the philosophy of action.
16 It may be objected that this image is in danger of reintroducing the “digestive” image of consciousness that Sartre is at
pains to repudiate in his article in praise of Husserl’s notion of intentionality, Sartre, “Intentionality: A Fundamental
Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology.” I acknowledge that danger, but nevertheless, if we are careful to bear in mind
that I introduce it as part of an attempt to describe consciousness’s continuous, active and transformative engagement
with the world, rather than its digestive “assimilation” of meaningless data, then I think it is ultimately less problematic
than Sartre’s preferred alternative image of consciousness as a series of “bursts,” which is in danger of atomizing and
decontextualizing conscious acts.
17 Solomon, The Passions 232–40; Solomon, Dark Feelings, Grim Thoughts: Experience and Reflection in Camus and Sartre
93–113.
18 Wollheim, On the Emotions; Gardner, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: A Reader’s Guide.
6 T. GREAVES
“epistemological model” of emotion.19 This line of defence can be further developed by
returning to the context of practical life in which Sartre’s phenomenology situates
emotions and showing that a deeper reason for Sartre’s sometimes misleading descrip-
tions is that he focuses exclusively on emotions that de-determine practical intuition
rather than situating each emotion in a continuous cycle of de-determination and re-
determination.20 Instead of considering emotion as aiming exclusively at the constitution
of a “magical world,” we should consider the magical element in emotion as all of those
practices that transform the world as practically intuited. As an initial defence of this
modification of Sartre’s view I will end this section by arguing that it mitigates three
long-standing and interrelated objections to his theory as presented in the Sketch.
First, there is the question of whether Sartre considers emotions to be a class of action,
and, if he does, whether he is right to do so. There is no doubt that Sartre emphasizes the
active elements of emotion, as opposed to the traditional conception that considers
emotions to be primarily passive, although some commentators have recently tried to
make room for the “affectivity” of emotions in Sartre’s account.21 Sartre’s account con-
siders emotions as ways of engaging with the difficulties of practical life by working on
practical intuition, rather than attempts to escape difficultly by ignoring or abandoning
the problem.22 Nor do I think that we should read Sartre’s early understanding of
emotion as simply the “cover up” of difficulties, as Daniel Vanello suggests when he
argues that we should read “emotion” as misrepresentation and illusory disclosure of
the evaluative import of a situation, and “affectivity” as the genuine disclosure of evalua-
tive import.23 Instead, there remains an internal tension in the disclosive power of
emotions that makes them both essential elements of our continuous engagement with
situations and yet always in danger of distorting that engagement, as I will argue in
more detail in Section 4. Nevertheless, emotional engagement often takes forms that
attempt to make the problem go away, as in Sartre’s examples of passive fear expressed
in a faint or active fear expressed as flight.24 Emotions for Sartre involve various types of
behaviour and conduct that are directed towards an end (they have “finality”), but are
unreflective or pre-reflective.25 The question of action then is really the question of
whether emotional conduct is effective as engagement with practical difficulty, and as
we have seen the answer for Sartre is that it is not, because he considers emotional
conduct as exclusively the de-determination of practical pathways.
My modified Sartrean account allows us to see how emotions remain connected to
effective conduct, even when at some particular moment their finality is ineffective.
Spontaneous sobbing in an awkward social moment or turning from a charging bear
are emotions directed towards annihilating the problem faced by consciousness. They
may not be effective in themselves but in certain circumstances, when no determinate
19 Hartmann, “A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre’s Theory of Emotions” 146.
20 Barnes, “Sartre on the Emotions.” anticipates some aspects of this defence, arguing that the view of affectivity as inte-
gral to effective praxis is implicit in Sartre’s early work and fully developed in his later work. However, it is the early
emphasis on emotion as transformation of the determinacy of practical intuitions that I think we need to maintain.
21 Hartmann, “A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre’s Theory of Emotions”; Hatzimoysis, “Sartre and
Affectivity.”
22 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 43–44.
23 Vanello, “Sartre’s Theory of Motivation” 260.
24 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 66–67.
25 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 61.
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paths present themselves, they can open up a moment of leeway. In that moment it is
possible to “gather oneself,” even as one seems to be falling apart, to consider the inde-
terminate contours of the situation and to move to a second moment of transformation
in which the world is re-determined and one can then choose a potentially effective path.
Sobbing, whilst clearly preventing effective action in some circumstances, may at other
times afford one leeway in which hitherto inconceivable responses can make an appear-
ance. To return to the example of active fear and flight from a ferocious beast, the flight is
not in itself an act of pure prudence, but again it may give one a moment of indetermi-
nate leeway in which pathways to shelter can present themselves.
The second question that this modified account helps us to address is whether Sartre’s
introduction of a second type of emotion ultimately renders his account inconsistent.
There are, Sartre claims towards the end of the Sketch:
[...] two forms of emotion, according to whether it is we who constitute the magic of the
world to replace a deterministic activity which cannot be realized, or whether the world
itself is unrealizable and reveals itself suddenly as a magical environment.26
Sartre’s example of the second type is of horror at a face that suddenly appears at the
window. Some commentators have argued that this second type of emotion cannot be
accommodated by the view of emotion as conduct that constitutes a magical world,27
whilst others have defended the consistency of Sartre’s account.28 At issue here is the
primacy of active conduct in bringing about the indeterminate “magical” intuition in
each case, an issue again related to the relative activity or passivity of emotions.
Whether or not we judge Sartre’s text to be consistent, the modification that I propose
suggests that we need not see the two types of emotion as inconsistent. The two types
can be thought in terms of the two directions of transformation in a continuous cycle
for transformations between determinate and indeterminate practical intuitions. If
emotional conduct is a response to and transformation of our determinate and indeter-
minate intuitions, then what appeared to Sartre to be “two types” of emotion are in fact
emotions that begin on the one hand in a moment of relative determinacy, and, on the
other hand, in the moment or relative indeterminacy. The practical world is not initially
or primarily “instrumental” or “magical,” but a continual cycle of transformation
between the two. The two types of emotion are better understood as transformations
from a more to a less determined world and from a less to a more determined world.29
The idea that transformation of the world in practical metabolism is relative and con-
tinuous brings us to the third point of contention. Critics have argued that Sartre’s Sketch
presents us with a “two world” theory of emotions, that both draws the distinction
between these worlds too sharply and makes it difficult to see how events in a fully
26 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 86.
27 Solomon, Dark Feelings, Grim Thoughts: Experience and Reflection in Camus and Sartre; Richmond, “Magic in Sartre’s
Early Philosophy.”
28 Elpidorou, “Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions”; Hartmann, “A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look
at Sartre’s Theory of Emotions.”
29 This solution to the “two types” problem contrasts with that proposed by Elpidorou, “Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean
Account of Emotions,” who suggests that we can maintain the consistency of Sartre’s account by dropping the require-
ment that emotion involves a transformation of practical intuition and maintaining that emotions involve either such a
transformation or behaviour within an already constituted magical world. My proposal makes transformation essential
in both cases, considering all actions and emotions as moments of transformation in an open-ended context and
drawing into question the idea that the world is ever fully constituted as instrumental or magical.
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determinate world can motivate a transformation into an indeterminate world.30 In
Sartre’s defence Hartmann has again suggested that these criticisms are uncharitable.31
Emphasizing that reflection does not interpose in emotional transformations Sartre
himself says: “There may be continuous passage from the non-reflective consciousness
‘instrumental world’ (action) to the non-reflective consciousness ‘hateful world’
(anger). The latter is a transformation of the former.”32 If that is so, then it is possible
to argue that Sartre does not propose a “two world thesis” at all, but rather uses the
terms “instrumental” and “magical” to name the one and only practical world at
different moments in its continuous transformation. On that reading it is not a great
stretch to the idea that the continuous transformation goes both ways and forms a cycli-
cal practical metabolism of emotional transformation.
3. Dances, Spells and Taboo: Magic as Affective Praxis
Having set out the notion of practical metabolism and given some initial reasons for
thinking that the concept gives us a more complete understanding of the integration
emotions into practical life than Sartre’s account alone, in this section I will develop
the concept more fully by drawing on Collingwood’s thinking of magic as the practice
of emotion. I begin by showing that Sartre’s and Collingwood’s views can be plausibly
and fruitfully combined. I go on to argue that doing so gives us a fuller account of the
role of magical activity in the twofold emotional transformation of the world that I
have called practical metabolism, together with a better appreciation of the socially
mediated magical practices that evoke those transformations.
It is striking that both Sartre and Collingwood link the expression of emotion with an
attempt to show that magical activity is a ubiquitous and necessary feature of practical
life.33 Whilst a handful of commentators have made the connection between Colling-
wood and Sartre before, there has been no substantial comparative analysis of the two
thinkers. Spencer Wertz notes the similarity between Collingwood’s anthropology of
emotions and Sartre’s theory of emotions as transformations of situations.34 Louis
Mink suggested a more specific convergence between Collingwood’s notion of the “cor-
ruption of consciousness” and Sartre’s notion of “bad faith.”35 The same connection was
made later by James Gilman, who argued that corruption of consciousness is the most
enduring feature of Collingwood’s analysis of Nazism’s desire for magical expression
in the context of modernity’s disenchantment.36 I follow up these connections in
Section 4 below, where I argue that thinking in terms of practical metabolism allows
30 Fell III, Emotion in the Thought of Sartre; Cogan, “Emotion and Sartre’s Two Worlds.” Barrett, “The Rational and the
Emotional: A Defence of Sartre’s Theory of the Emotions.” defends the separation of the “two worlds,” but does so
by implausibly aligning instrumental intuitions with cognition, reflection and rationality.
31 Hartmann, “A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre’s Theory of Emotions” 151.
32 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 58.
33 As should become clear Collingwood’s account of magical expression undermines any possible distinction between
expressivist/emotivist approaches and instrumental/functionalist approaches, which is key to his affinity with
Sartre. Heikki Saari, for example, criticizes Collingwood on a number of points that stem from the claim that he
draws too sharp a distinction between “emotive” and “instrumental” accounts of magic and also that he downplays,
“the social nature of magical practices and their communal consequences,” “R. G. Collingwood’s Emotivist Theory of
Magic” 106. Such criticisms could not possibly remain plausible following the publication of the Folktales Manuscript.
34 Wertz, Food and Philosophy: Selected Essays 166.
35 Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood 11.
36 Gilman, “R. G. Collingwood and the Religious Sources of Nazism” 119.
JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 9
us to understand how the structure of emotional praxis itself tends towards distinct but
related kinds of breakdown and perversion. In this section I lay the groundwork for
understanding what can go wrong in magical expression by drawing on Collingwood’s
phenomenologically rich descriptions to show how a functioning practical metabolism
works in practice.
One potential objection to this argument is that Collingwood’s understanding of
magic as the evocation of motivating emotion cannot be made to fit with my modified
Sartrean account because it lacks the key phenomenological insight that emotion is a
transformation of the world, that is, a transformation of the meaning of the entire prac-
tical context presented in practical intuition. Collingwood uses a number of different
images to model practical motivation. Perhaps the best known of these is the image of
a dynamo, producing energy that can be discharged in action.37 Since it is the claim
that emotion transforms the world that is distinctive of Sartre’s account, rather than
thinking of emotion as the discharge of energy into a ready-made world, one might
wonder whether Collingwood’s approach can be considered phenomenological.38 In
Principles of Art Collingwood aims at upholding categorial distinctions (principally
between “craft” and “expression”) that result in his holding magic to be the craft of pro-
ducing (or “arousing”) emotions for practical motivation. The idea of production of
emotion may in part explain the use of the dynamo image in that text. Yet even in the
less theoretically driven Folktales Manuscript Collingwood already uses images related
to the dynamo; in particular, he frequently refers to magic as the generation of
emotion to be “discharged” in practical activity.39
However, it is not only images of energetics that Collingwood deploys to describe the
role of emotion in practical life. He also uses images of “crystallisation,” “consolidation”
and “canalisation” of emotion into practical pathways. These images suggest more readily
that emotions are transformations of the world in Sartre’s sense. This is what Colling-
wood has to say about a war-dance:
The war-dance does not effect a catharsis of the warlike emotions: on the contrary, it crystal-
lizes them as emotions, and confirms the dancer’s resolution to discharge them through the
channel of action.40
The image of crystallization suggests that the emotions in question were fluid intuitions
of practical potential before they are crystallized into determinate pathways in the course
of the dance. There was fluid potential for the appropriate martial action, but it was not
crystallized into the pathways of this particular battle. The dance crystallizes those path-
ways and, one might even say, the battle begins with the dance. Magic involves an appre-
hension of the world with its fluid and loosely laid out contours of action together with
activity that crystallizes emotion and in doing so canalizes the pathways of action.
37 Collingwood, The Principles of Art 69.
38 I cannot give a complete defence of Collingwood’s phenomenological credentials here. For studies that argue for the
convergence of Collingwood’s approach and method with phenomenology see Rubinoff, “Religion and the Rapproche-
ment between Thought and Action” 95; Stanage, “Collingwood’s Phenomenology of Education: Person and the Self-
Recognition of Mind”; Eisenstein, Phenomenology of Civilisation: Reason as a Regulative Principle in Collingwood and
Husserl; Reda, “Specular Phenomenology: Art and Art Criticism.”
39 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 200–05; 227–28.
40 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 228, my emphasis. See also 231–32; cf. Collingwood, The Principles of Art
66, 75.
10 T. GREAVES
Like Sartre, Collingwood was in part responding to Freud and he picks up Freud’s use
of energetics imagery. Yet at the same time Collingwood clearly sees that emotional
transformation requires an account in terms of meaning. Robert Solomon draws an
influential distinction between “hydraulic” and “meaning” models of emotion and high-
lights Freud’s vacillation between the two.41 The apparent vacillation might, however, be
understood as an attempt to model the dynamic structures of meaning. This is what Col-
lingwood does by deploying these images, and I have done so in turn by deploying the
physiological model of metabolism. In Collingwood’s case the dynamo image seems
designed to pick up on the popular understanding of motivation, and thus might chari-
tably be interpreted as an attempt to shift that understanding towards a meaning-based
account.
Magic then, for both Sartre and Collingwood, is activity that brings about the
emotional transformation of practical intuition. For Sartre, emotion is the world trans-
formed or revealed as practically indeterminate, and thus for him the indeterminate
world is a “magical world.” For Collingwood, magic is the set of activities that result
in a practically determinate world, one in which motivation is the crystallization or cana-
lization of practical pathways. If we combine these two moments of magical activity we
have a complete practical metabolism.
What Collingwood’s historical and aesthetic method also adds to Sartre’s account is a
fuller understanding of the various kinds of magical activity that are involved in both
directions for transformation that form our practical metabolism. Emotional responses
are spontaneous, but that spontaneity always takes place within a social situation with
its existing magic rituals and ways of expressing emotion. As Hartmann argues,
emotion is expressed in a world that is already emotionally structured.42 Magical
expression may be spontaneous and unreflective, but it does not take place in isolated
moments; it has social significance in relation to social practices. Those practices may
or may not be formally instituted into the fabric of society. The practical expression of
emotion and magical activity can be relatively simple, such as carrying a personal
lucky charm, or it can have a complex structure in which spontaneous responses form
habits and social institutions, such as communal dancing rituals.
Sartre does stress the importance of the social situation that informs and is informed
by emotions. However, in the Sketch he describes isolated situations, as though social life
consisted of a series of vignettes from a single point of view, rather than a social field
involving shared emotional transformations. What Sartre does emphasize is the embodi-
ment of magical expressions in the form of incantation and dance. Thus, when discussing
joy, which he initially puts forward as a potential counter-example to his claim that
emotion is a response to practical difficulty, Sartre argues that through incantation
and dance, joy becomes an attempt to realize the impossible: “to realize the possession
of the desired object as an instantaneous totality.”43 The activity works symbolically:
“To dance, or to sing, for joy – these represent the behaviour of symbolic approximation,
of incantation.”44 He then notes the huge variety of emotional expressions that are not
exhausted by such examples, but claims that embodied symbolical modes of expression
41 Solomon, The Passions 139–50.
42 Hartmann, “A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre’s Theory of Emotions” 152.
43 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 72.
44 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 72.
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are nevertheless pervasive: “We are only affirming that [emotions] are all reducible to the
constitution of a magic world, by making use of our bodies as instruments of incanta-
tion.”45 The bodily incantations that Sartre uses as examples are not obviously set in
the midst of custom and tradition, although it is clear that their “symbolical” power
must derive from such a setting.
Collingwood is far more focussed on the customs and traditions of magical expression.
He describes four groupings of magical custom and belief in the Folktales Manuscript,
analysing their basic structures and showing their complex interrelations and potential
for cross-contamination. He designates these groupings as: (i) those concerned with
the “external soul” or “outposts of the personality”; (ii) those connected with ritual ablu-
tions; (iii) those arising out of the use of tools; (iv) those that anthropologists group under
the term “taboo.”46 In each case Collingwood gives descriptions of emotional responses
in both “primitive” and “modern” contexts, with the aim of showing that, “the magical
practice has its basis in emotions which are universally human and can be verified as
existing, and even sometimes as giving rise to definite customs, in and among our-
selves.”47 For instance, practices concerned with the “external soul” range from the
ritual destruction of an enemy’s discarded nail clippings, as an attempt to discourage
that enemy along the lines of disfiguring a portrait, to the customary wearing of hats
in Edwardian society, as symbolic protection when going out into society. In each
instance, and in all of these groupings, one can immediately see that the emotional
expression takes place in response to – and as a way of shaping – the social situation.
The social situation has its own history, so that even if the emotions can be shown to
be universally human, they do not always give rise to definite customs; and when they
do, those customs can take radically different forms.48
Magical practices are formed through the social mediation of relatively immediate
emotional expressions. Such mediations can be understood as generating a field of
shared and often conflicting transformations or metabolic exchanges. In the case of
magical “attacks” such as the ritual destruction of nail clippings, Collingwood describes
the immediate expressions of two persons. The first person feels that something forming
an outpost of his personality must be cherished, “protecting it from accidental or mali-
cious damage.”49 A second person expresses anger or repugnance towards another by
damaging or disrespectfully treating something cherished by their enemy. However,
emotional expressions of this kind do not tend to remain isolated events. Fully fledged
magical attacks occur when performed in an open-ended social situation, incorporating
these two relatively immediate expressions:
In this situation, the established habits of society, based on the emotional facts already
described, are such that the victim knows and fears that the agent is acting in this way,
and consequently sustains injury in the shape of mortification and whatever consequences
this implies.50
45 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 73.
46 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 221–22.
47 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 221.
48 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 198.
49 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 119.
50 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 200.
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Magical attack of this kind incorporates habitual expression and intentional action, with
the potential to form institutionalized rituals. These social practices in turn form a
context for the formation of new habits of expression. That there are different layers
of emotional expression and magical activity entails that there is never a total transform-
ation of practical intuition from an absolutely “instrumental” to a “magical” world. In the
case just described the “mortification” of the injured party is an indefinite sense of injury
to the self: how can/should I go on when parts of the world so intimate to me are open to
control and manipulation by others? Yet the ritual undertaken to bring about that mor-
tification, and thus emotional injury, can follow very definite and defined practical path-
ways to the goal of such mortification. The spell transforms the world in two directions at
once: for the enchanted the world becomes difficult and indefinite, for the magician it
forms a definite set of potential pathways to magical injury of the enemy.
Conflict in direction of transformation can also arise in one’s own immediate
expression, and is then built into the social practices that form the medium of expression.
Collingwood describes the conflicted emotions of those grieving for a dead relative or
spouse. On the one hand they are overwhelmed by a feeling of loss that their emotions
no longer have a “channel” in which to express themselves; on the other hand, they
realize that they will need to form new relationships and find new channels for such
self-expression.51 Practical activity and emotional life are caught between dissolution
and the requirement for resolution. In so far as they act on the second requirement,
transforming an indeterminate into a determinate practical intuition, they feel guilt at
their betrayal of the dead and are haunted by them. This is the basic emotional
conflict at the heart of the multitude of customs and beliefs involving ghosts and haunt-
ing. The framework of practical metabolism allows us to see the phenomenal structure of
such conflicts. These emotional expressions and concomitant magical activity are caught
between the two directions of transformation in practical metabolism.
A functioning practical metabolism is thus not a perfectly smooth cycle of transform-
ations of practical intuition from a single perspective. Collingwood is alive to the com-
plexities and tensions that arise in the functioning of practical metabolism. He thinks
of magic as a continuous practical activity that not only helps us to navigate practical situ-
ations but also to transform them. Henry Harris has complained that Collingwood’s
energetics images exclude many practical applications of magical activity: “Magic is
not only a ‘dynamo’; it is can also be a ‘tune-up.’”52 Harris reminds us that together
with production of emotion, magic often involves the management of emotion and
thus takes on not only a directly motivational but also a therapeutic role. In the Folktales
Manuscript, published after Harris made this objection, Collingwood shows that he was
well aware of the potential for magic to effect an emotional “tune-up”:
[…] magical practices are not utilitarian activities based on scientific theories whether true
or false, but spontaneous expressions of emotion whose utility, so far as they have any utility,
lies in the fact that they resolve emotional conflicts in the agent and so readjust him to the
practical life for which these conflicts render him unfitted […]53
51 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 202.
52 Harris, “Magic and Society in Collingwood’s Aesthetics” 15.
53 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 208.
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Motivation effected by magic is not a question of generating a context-independent
energy, but involves the expression of emotion as the transformation of socially mediated
situations of conflict and frustration.
The various types of magical activity that Collingwood analyses all involve the
complex interplay of potentially conflicting emotional responses and the incorporation
of immediate expression into social mediation. When it comes to the category
“taboo,” the distinction between immediate expression and social mediation closes up
entirely, whilst the conflict between the determinate and indeterminate transformations
of practical intuition remains at the heart of social life. Collingwood argues that taboo is
best understood as “emotional sanction.” He contrasts this with both legal and moral
sanction, since the action is not prosecuted and punished by officers of the law, nor
thought to be in itself inherently wrong. It is simply the disapproval felt by those who
break a social convention, however innocently.54 The “primitive” and “modern”
examples he offers are, firstly a Polynesian tribesman refraining from eating pigs
outside of ritual feasting for which they have been reserved, through fear of social ostra-
cism; and secondly, the “intolerable atmosphere of disapproval” felt by a young man who
arrives at a formal dinner party in flannels. Taboo forms a special yet ubiquitous group of
magical expressions whose direct intentional object is the emotional state of the other
and for which the medium of expression is nothing but the emotional conduct itself.
Towards the end of the Sketch Sartre too gives a brief indication of the ubiquitous
magical activity and emotional conflict found in social interaction. For him, situations
involving only things can be relatively in control and consolidated, so as to be reasonably
described in terms of the game of guiding the ball through the pins. But the face of the
other is never consolidated in that way: “It follows that man is always a sorcerer to man
and the social world is primarily magical.”55 This observation is precisely what Colling-
wood’s analysis of taboo substantiates. Yet what Collingwood reveals, by situating
magical expressions of emotion in open-ended practical activity, is that there is never
in practice a completely “magical” world, any more than there is ever a completely
“instrumental” world. At most the two worlds might be held out as idealized completions
of what are in practice always incomplete intuitions, idealizations that help us to gauge
the current direction of transformation. As I will argue in the next section, such idealiz-
ations, when made into ends in themselves, form the basis of structural pathologies in
practical and emotional life.
4. Metabolic Breakdown: False Emotions and Perversions of Magic
Both Sartre and Collingwood use their descriptions of emotional transformations of
practical intuition to outline distinctive ways of understanding the dynamic structure
of practical life and its disturbances. The integration of their approaches in the notion
of practical metabolism allows us to produce a new and more comprehensive description
of these phenomena.
(a) False Emotion and Bad Faith in Sartre
54 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 222–23.
55 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 85. See, Van der Wielen, “The Magic of the Other: Sartre on Our Relation with
Others in Ontology and Experience.”
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For many of Sartre’s readers it has been at least uncertain whether there can be, on his
account, any such thing as a healthy emotional life. A clear line of development can be
traced from the analysis of emotions in the Sketch to the analysis of bad faith in Being
and Nothingness.56 Indeed, Sartre uses some of the same terms to describe them both,
such as the claim that emotion and bad faith are like putting oneself to sleep.57
Sadness features as one of the examples of bad faith in Being and Nothingness and
Sartre refers his readers back to the Sketch in that passage.58 When Sartre describes
the origin of emotion as “spontaneous debasement of consciousness in the face of the
world,”59 it is clear why a long line of critics holds his descriptions to apply only to
“extreme” or “malformed” emotions.60 As mentioned above, Solomon takes “magic”
to signify self-deceptive emotional conduct, arguing in a more recent analysis of the
Sketch that we should modify Sartre’s account by removing the requirement that
emotional transformations of the world necessarily involve magic.61 My proposal, on
the contrary, is that we focus on the behaviours and rituals of magic that Sartre describes
as part and parcel of the transformation of practical intuition. These transformations do
not reach a point of completion in a wholly indeterminate magical world. “Magic” is not
a state of self-deception, since self-deception is for Sartre itself a continuous and unstable
activity. Neither is magical activity aimed at producing a particular emotional state, but
rather the continuous and open-ended de-determination and re-determination of prac-
tical intuition. Thus the dynamic structure of practical life incorporates various ten-
dencies towards self-deception but is not self-deceptive as such.
Sartre views emotion as an ineluctable feature of human life, since consciousness
cannot have its defining intentional structure unless it assumes some passivity, and
thus “abases itself,” in the face of the world.62 A healthy emotional life is not a life
that, per impossible, avoids all emotion.63 Rather, a healthy emotional life is alive to
the intrinsic possibilities of bad faith that emotional expression harbours, e.g. the
acting out of “false” emotions that do not enact a transformation of the world, or clinging
to the experience of one’s emotions by deeming them the result of states or qualities of
the self.64
(b) Collingwood on the Perversion of Magic
Collingwood’s notion of the “corruption of consciousness,” when emotional expression
is blocked or misunderstood, corresponds in many ways to Sartre’s notion of bad faith.65
In the context of his discussions of practical expression of emotion in magical activity,
however, Collingwood refers not to the corruption of consciousness per se, but to a set
of intrinsic “perversions” of magical activity.
56 Walker, “Sartre and Sour Grapes”; Heldt, “The Magical and Bad Faith: Reflection, Desire and the Image of Value.”
57 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 78; Sartre, Being and Nothingness 115.
58 Sartre, Being and Nothingness 105.
59 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 79.
60 Fell III, Emotion in the Thought of Sartre, Wollheim, On the Emotions.
61 Solomon, The Passions 232–40; Solomon, Dark Feelings, Grim Thoughts: Experience and Reflection in Camus and Sartre
110.
62 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 79.
63 Hartmann, “A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre’s Theory of Emotions.”
64 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 75; Sartre, Being and Nothingness 105.
65 Collingwood, The Principles of Art 284–85.
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The basic structure of magical perversion according to Collingwood is:
[...] the false belief that when we have expressed the emotions instigating a certain course of
action we have as good as done the corresponding action itself: the belief that the fruits of
action can be enjoyed by merely expressing our desire for them.66
Such a belief, we may surmise, need not be reflective or explicitly articulated. In fact, it
seems likely that it is a belief that will rarely if ever be articulated in its own right; rather it
will be manifest in the expression together with the failure to act that constitute the per-
version. Explicit articulation would tend to undermine one’s ability to hold the belief,
which is one of the features that such perversions share with bad faith. Furthermore,
the belief in question is no arbitrary failure, but bound to the structure of magical
expressions as practical motivation, since such expressions are not disconnected preludes
to action, but the initiation of a course of action. The perversion of magic is the initiation
of action that gets caught up in its own initial phase and thus fails to follow through on
what has been initiated. If we consider such perversions in terms of malfunctioning prac-
tical metabolism, they occur whenever transformation of practical intuition becomes
unidirectional and cut off from the open-ended context of practical concern.
Collingwood subjects this basic structure of magical perversion to further analysis that
corresponds well with a phenomenological analysis of the intentionality of practical
intuition. Perversions fall into two types depending up whether one’s misunderstanding
amounts to a misconception of how magic relates to its objects or of how it relates to the
person who performs it. These two types of perversion will be intimately connected, since
action is one undivided whole, whether considered from the side of the object or from the
side of the agent (“intentional object” and “intentional act” in phenomenological terms).
The “objective” perversion comprises all those cases where magical expressions are
thought to achieve concrete goals directly without further action, since they are experi-
enced as actions complete in themselves. This perversion leads to interpretations of
magic as “pseudo-science” and “primitive technology,” associated with early anthropolo-
gical thinkers such as Edward Tylor and James Frazer. Those interpretations are mislead-
ing according to Collingwood, but they do capture something of the truth because they
describe a ubiquitous form of magical perversion. Spells and rituals are substituted for
the action they should initiate and those subject to this perversion may also persuade
themselves that such expressions are not only effective in their own right, but also
afford them superhuman powers.67
A “subjective” perversion, on the other hand, subverts an action by confusing the kind
of expression or intentional act in which one is engaged. A tension arises here between
magic and other types of artistic expression. In Collingwood’s terms art has the potential
to “earth” emotion by providing an adequate expression of one’s being in a particular
situation, whilst magical art must come to fruition in a complete action. Thus, if one
were to settle for a poetic cursing of the river that has flooded one’s farm then the
magical expression of emotion has been perverted by making it into art; in functioning
magic the curse needs to serve as the initiation of action, such as building an
66 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 321.
67 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 231–32.
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embankment. Objective perversions are illusions of unmediated influence through ima-
gined techniques, whilst subjective perversions are wish-fulfilment fantasies.68
(c) Breakdowns of Practical Metabolism
If we consider emotional breakdowns in practical life and their concomitant perversions
of magical activity in terms of the notion of practical metabolism I have set out above,
this will give us a new perspective on such phenomena; allowing us to accommodate
these insights from Sartre and Collingwood and appreciate the twofold role of emotional
transformation in the open-ended context of praxis, rather than as a series of discrete
episodes.
Practical metabolism describes the dynamic structure of praxis as the reciprocal and
cyclical transformation of practical intuition through magical activity: the “de-determi-
nation” of that intuition in which practical potential is experienced as indeterminate
but not entirely amorphous; and the “re-determination” of practical intuition as the
motivating concretization or crystallization of our practical pathways. The emotions of
practical life are thus a continuous and coherent cycle of transformations in practical
intuition. These transformations and reconfigurations of our world of potential allow
us to continually adjust to the difficulties of the situation, as in the earlier example of
a war-dance that initiates the dancer into the world of the battle, where they must be
both flexible and resolute. Each transformation will to one degree or another disturb
an established intuition, but such disturbances are not in themselves problematic. Pro-
blems arise when we find ourselves unwilling or unable to facilitate and endure
further emotional transformations.
The twofold structure of practical metabolism entails two kinds of emotional incapa-
city and related perversions of magical activity. On the one hand, practical life becomes
one-sided for those who are focused exclusively on addressing difficulty by freeing up the
rigid pathways of practical potential. On the other hand, practical life is equally one-sided
for those who insist that a “practical attitude” could only ever involve following one set of
predetermined pathways towards a clearly determined goal. The first one-sidedness
draws the imaginative side of practical life towards escapist fantasy.69 The second one-
sidedness tends to eschew any imaginative and emotional de-canalization of practical
potential, insisting that we must stay on the straight and narrow pathways that have
already been determined, risking the inability to reconfigure the practical landscape.
Magical activity is “perverted,” in terms of the view I have developed here, when it no
longer facilitates emotional transformation of practical intuition, but instead is under-
taken in an attempt to hold on to either of these “realist” or “fantasist” worlds. Consider
again the magical dances described by Sartre and Collingwood. A dance of joy, according
to Sartre, is a magical attempt to “possess” symbolically a desired object completely in an
“instantaneous moment,” when the possibilities of the situation could never all be
68 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 233.
69 O’Shiel, “Sartre’s Magical Being: An Introduction by Way of an Example.” Emotion remains distinct from pure imagin-
ation in that the latter either negates or neutralies what it posits, whilst the former presents us with a situation we
believe in as the situation in which we must act, see Sartre, The Imaginary 11. Nevertheless, imagination forms an inte-
gral element of the situation, which is negotiated by way of emotional transformation, Webber, “Philosophical Intro-
duction" to The Imaginary, xxvi. See also Hatzimoysis, “Sartre and Affectivity” concerning the connection and apparent
tension between Sartre’s early accounts of emotion and imagination.
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fulfilled. A dance of joy following the receipt of a declaration of love is an attempt to deal
with the ungraspable multiplicity of possibilities that the declaration affords its recipient
in an activity celebrating and constituting this moment of indeterminacy.70 Colling-
wood’s description of a war-dance takes the activity of the dance to be the “crystallisa-
tion” of war-like emotion and “confirmation of the dancer’s resolution to discharge
them through the channel of action.”71 Thus we have dancing that facilitates transform-
ation of practical intuition in the first instance towards a de-determining of practical
pathways and in the second instance toward a re-determining of those pathways. In
each instance the dancing might be “perverted” when it does not facilitate any such trans-
formation, but instead attempts to block or subvert transformation. In the case of the
lover’s dance, a determined realist might dance only to show how much they have
been affected by the declaration of love. This blocks the expanded, indeterminate, see-
mingly “endless” possibilities that the moment of joy brings. Of course, as Sartre
warns us, that is far from all that there is to love and the attempt to hold fast to the
moment of joy and deny the need to act concretely “through countless details (smiles,
little attentions, etc.),”72 would be an equal and opposite perversion. In the case of the
war-dance, perversion occurs in Collingwood’s terms if, in a situation of war, the
dance ends up absorbing war-like emotion rather than initiating battle. Seen in the
open context of practical metabolism, further possibilities and complexities arise. The
dance channels the warriors’ attention towards the enemy and in the repetition of ritua-
lized actions of battle the warriors rehearse the pathways that determine their practical
intuition. However, if the dance leaves the dancers with a fixed and immutable determi-
nation they will be ill-equipped to deal with the vicissitudes of the battle as it unfolds. A
truly effective dance must therefore also build in an open responsiveness to the unfolding
situation by allowing space for the de-determination of practical intuition. It might do
that through interaction of dancers, or in a dance like the Maori haka, through respon-
siveness to the enemy towards whom the dance is directed. A rigidly ritualized war-dance
will not ready a warrior for battle any better than a free improvisation.
Perversion of magical activity and stilted emotions result in a practical life that fails to
incorporate the tensions that arise from the dual necessities of practical metabolism. A
healthy emotional life, both personally and socio-historically speaking, will not elide
or attempt to overcome those tensions, but develop forms of expression that incorporate
open-ended transformations of indeterminacy and determination.
5. Conclusion
Drawing on Collingwood’s account of magical activity, I have set the phenomena that
Sartre investigates in the Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions in the context of open-
ended and cyclical transformations of the world that constitute the dynamic structure
of practical life. Describing indeterminate practical intuition as a “magical world,” as
Sartre does, is misleading because any such intuition forms only one moment in the
dynamic of practical metabolism. We should therefore distinguish that sense of magic
70 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 72–73.
71 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 228.
72 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 73.
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as indeterminate practical intuition from magical activity as emotional expressions that
both determine and de-determine practical intuition. Whilst each emotion, as transform-
ation of the world, may tend towards a completely determined or indeterminate world,
problematic emotional disturbances of practical life come about when we feel and believe
that the transformation is indeed complete. Then, as Sartre writes, “Liberation can come
only from a purifying reflection or from the total disappearance of the emotional situ-
ation,”73 but for the most part such liberation from the transformative power of
emotion is neither necessary nor desirable.
I have argued that the phenomenal structure of practical metabolism can incorporate
the dynamic and affective tensions that arise in practical life without homogenizing the
vast array of distinct emotions. I have also shown that the concept of practical metab-
olism allows us to undertake the appraisal of emotions in terms of the open-ended
context of practical life, rather than as a disjointed series of affective events. Thinking
of the emotions in these terms will allow for further investigation of other affective
experiences and their structural relations to magical practices and behaviour. Twenty-
first century social and political life abounds with often very problematic “magical”
thought and conduct, from climate change denial to manipulation of behaviour by
social media platforms. The answer to such “perverted” magic is not to try to extirpate
magical behaviour and its concomitant emotional transformations from our lives,
since they form the very core of practical life itself. The idea of practical metabolism I
have developed here, by combining insights from Sartre and Collingwood, gives us a fra-
mework for the phenomenological analysis of how these perversions arise and how they
are sustained.
This framework also helps us to develop a fully integrated understanding of the
emotions. Both Sartre and Collingwood consider their functional accounts of emotion
to be inseparable from intentional accounts of affectivity. Thinking of magical activity
as constitutive of the transformation of practical intuition leads to an integrated
approach that neither separates emotional behaviour from affectivity, nor distinguishes
the “third person” functional account of emotions found in the Sketch from a “first
person” intentional account.74 As Collingwood puts it: “The feeling and the custom
are not two separate things which can be related as cause and effect. There is only one
thing. The custom is the outward side of it, the feeling the inward side.”75 Nevertheless,
more detailed analysis is needed of how the two sides seem to come apart in false
emotions and perversions of magic.
More broadly, the phenomenal structure I have set out focuses on emotions as they
play out in the midst of practical life. There are significant areas of affective experience
which, whilst not strictly emotions in this sense, would be amenable to further investi-
gation in the light of the structure of practical metabolism. Heidegger’s “fundamental
attunements” and what Matthew Radcliffe calls “existential feelings” are experiences,
and often disturbances, of practical life and the constitution of practical intuition as
such, rather than transformations of practical intuition and its activity.76 These moods
73 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 81.
74 Hartmann, “A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre’s Theory of Emotions” 157; Hatzimoysis, “Sartre and
Affectivity.”
75 Collingwood, The Philosophy of Enchantment 211.
76 Heidegger, Being and Time 178–83; Ratcliffe, Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality.
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confront us with practical life and its limits in ways that never entirely disengage us from
the practical situation, and a further elaboration of practical metabolism would need to
consider the dynamic relations between emotions and fundamental moods. Tempera-
ment too, whilst not itself a transformative emotion, might be fruitfully considered in
this framework as the rate and rhythm of emotional transformation. Further comparative
work on the parallel intellectual development of Sartre and Collingwood may well help in
this regard. Their respective accounts of imagination and art, bad faith and the corrup-
tion of consciousness, and even their apparently divergent social and political thought, all
draw on their understanding of emotions and are likely to provide provocative material
for further reflection on the integral relations between emotion, action and practical life.
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